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The Ontological Meta-Argument
(and the Ontological Argument 




Would the Ontological Argum ent Greater Than Which None Can Be 
Conceived prove the existence of God? Might an ontological argument prove 
the actuality o f the world (as Robert Nozick once suggested)? Should you 
believe that you ’re actual, even i f  you ’re not? And what happens i f  we attempt 
to answer these questions, having adopted Nozick’s mature view o f the 
function o f argument?
The fool hath said in his heart, the ontological argument doesn’t work. 
And of course he’s right. As St. Anselm rendered it,1 the argument is 
flawed in many ways— for instance, if it proved the existence of God, it 
would, as Guanilo pointed out during Anselm’s lifetime, also prove the  
existence of the greatest conceivable island— and Robert Nozick, whom 
we’re remembering here, has called it the “most famous of all fishy philo­
sophical arguments.” But since Nozick toyed with the idea that God would 
need it to prove His own existence to Himself, let’s see if we can’t do 
better.2
To be sure, whether or not we can come up with a better ontological 
argument is beside the point. W hat m atters is not what the ontological 
argument that we have proves, or whether we know how to fix it, but 
what is proved by the greatest conceivable ontological argument. After
* I’m grateful to Lori Alward, Alyssa Bernstein, Pepe Chang, Don Garrett, Lex 
Newman and Josh Sheptow for very helpful discussion on the topic, and to the Univer­
sity of Washington’s Helen Riaboff Whiteley Center for working space greater than 
which none can be conceived.
1 Proslogium, ch. 2; in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle: 
Open Court, 1961).
2 Robert Nozick, Invariances: The Structure o f the Objective World (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 130; “Testament,” in Socratic Puzzles (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 324-328.
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all, if there is an argument to be assembled, even one we will never find, 
that is valid, sound and has p  as its conclusion, then p  is true.
So consider the greatest conceivable ontological argument. F irst, an 
argument that works is better than an argument that doesn’t. So an on­
tological argument that does not work is not the best conceivable; the 
greatest conceivable ontological argument does work. Second, what does 
that argument prove? If we allow that arguments can be assessed not 
merely formally (for their validity, soundness, and other similar merits), 
but for their choice of subject m atter, we must also allow that the great­
est conceivable ontological argument must have the most important, deep­
est, and generally most impressive subject m atter: and surely that would 
be the existence of God. But then the greatest conceivable ontological 
argument is effective and it proves the existence of God.
Now you may want to reply that this argument (or, if you like, m eta­
argument) is not only flawed, but sophistical. And of course it is both. But 
again, what m atters is not what th is  ontological m eta-argum ent shows, 
but what the best conceivable ontological m eta-argum ent shows. And 
surely that argument would work, and would not be sophistical, and would 
have these very claims as its subject m atter, so th a t...
Nozick asked what it would take to show the world (and yourself) to 
be actual, rather than merely possible or fictional, and experimented with 
“a surrogate for the ontological argument, the best substitute that secu­
lar money can buy,” m eant to prove that our own world is actual, or any­
how, to explain why  it is actual.3 The reason for turning to an ontological 
argument is that you need to come up with something to say to convince 
yourself of your own actuality that a fictional or simply possible character 
couldn’t  say as well. Following the lead of the more traditional ontologi­
cal argument, Nozick takes it that the argument would turn on what he 
calls a Sufficient Explanatory Property— that is, a property such that 
having it would guarantee (or anyway, make reasonable the conclusion 
of) actual existence.
Unlike the more traditional ontological argument, where the pivotal 
property is part of the concept or definition of God, the premise that gets 
the argument for actuality off the ground will have to be confirmably, 
visibly true of the world we inhabit. The problem is that Sufficient E x­
planatory Properties have a glitzy, too-spectacular look to them; th at’s 
indicated by examples like ‘greater than which none can be conceived,’ 
which we’ve just been borrowing, or Leibniz’s ‘best of all possible worlds.’ 
Voltaire complained about Leibniz that our world is visibly not-so-spec- 
tacular; it is unlikely to have such a property.4
Nozick makes it clear that he doesn’t  intend the indexical understand­
ing of actuality th at’s become familiar in philosophical discussions of
'‘'Invariances, 164, emphasis deleted; the surrogate argument is sketched at 157­
168. See also “Fiction,” in Socratic Puzzles, 313-316.
4 Nozick considers “being average” as a Sufficient Explanatory Property. That’s 
less implausibly glitzy, but how likely is it that our world is the exactly average one—in 
the technical sense Nozick considers, or in any other reasonably exact sense? Still, this
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modality, on which “the actual world” just means, in your mouth, which­
ever possible world you’re in. His tag for the nonindexical alternative is 
“asymmetrical” actuality, and he allows that on an asymmetrical notion 
of actuality there might be more than one actual world. (On the usual 
way of thinking, there’s just one actual world.) However, if we allow that 
actual worlds are still going to be few and far between among the possibilia 
or fictions, then the likelihood that one’s own world is actual, in the ab­
sence of some argument to the contrary, ought to be very low indeed, low 
enough to make it rational for us to resign ourselves to being not more 
than mere might-have-beens.
Is there a m eta-argum ent for the actuality of our world that does bet­
ter? L et’s allow that the best argument for actuality does actually w ork... 
but that means, works in the actual world, which is not necessarily our 
world. The improved argument invoked by the m eta-argum ent works, 
but not for us.
If ontological arguments show God to be actual, but leave us convinced 
that our own world is not actual, then God turns out to be off in some 
other possible world. And provided that God can’t reach out to affect worlds 
H e’s not in, then we don’t have to worry about Him. (However, we will 
have to worry if God is the author of our fictional world.) An atheist might 
be tempted to gloat that ontological arguments give us the best of both 
worlds, by proving the existence of God, while getting us out from under 
His thumb.
However, perhaps only what is actual m atters. W e’re not usually all 
that upset about disasters that only m ight have happened, or all that 
proud of the things we might have done but didn’t; if we thought that we 
weren’t living in the actual world, wouldn’t we be more easygoing about 
achievements and catastrophes? And it would be hard to take a lot of 
credit for merely fictional accomplishments; those are no harder than an 
announcement on the part of one’s author. (Then again, maybe not: if it 
turned out that this world was merely possible, we might decide that we 
cared more about m ere possibility than we had thought.) Nozick memo­
rably demanded a thoughtful answer to the question, “Why do we care 
about actually living our lives, as contrasted with merely experiencing 
simulations of them ?”5 We likewise owe a thoughtful answer to the ques­
tion, “Why do we care about being actual rather than merely possible?”
Leaving that answer pending, if we do convince ourselves that what is 
actual m atters sufficiently more than what is merely possible, we make 
room for a version of Pascal’s Wager, to the effect that you should believe
move suggests seeing if the ontological argument could be improved by making it more 
modest. Surely something has to be at least good enough to count as God. And surely a 
God that didn’t  exist would hardly be good enough. (Call this the satisficing ontological 
argument.) But would this be the same God whose existence was going to be estab­
lished by the old-fashioned, maximalist ontological argument? And wouldn’t a merely 
good-enough God be a disappointment?
6 Anarchy, State, Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42-45.
that you are actual.6 For if you are actual, and you don’t  believe it, you 
will fail to be motivated to do much of anything that m atters— and that 
m atters a good deal. Whereas if you aren’t  actual, and you falsely believe 
that you are, well, it doesn’t  really m atter. But if the ontological m eta­
argument shows that God is actual, and a Pascal’s W ager on actuality 
shows that, even if the chances that you are actual are very small, you 
ought to believe yourself to be actual (and act that way too), then you 
ought to believe and act as though you are in God’s world.7
Now even if the argument were better than it is, I don’t  think Nozick 
would have found it compelling himself. Most philosophers are lucky if 
they can think of a single strong argument bearing on a claim; for them, 
accepting the conclusion of an argument they come up with is a method 
that usually gives univocal results. Nozick was a whole lot sm arter than  
most philosophers, however, and being as bright as that made the method 
unusable; when Nozick considered a claim, it was too easy for him to 
think of strong arguments pro and con. Since the arguments didn’t  give 
him a univocal answer, he decided that the value of arguments did not 
have to do with their compellingness. (Saying that you were forced to 
believe something by an argument was an evasion of responsibility on the 
part of the intelligent, and a way of bullying the less intelligent.) W hat 
arguments were for, rather, was to explain .8 In this spirit, it would prob­
ably be best to understand the Ontological Argument not as a substitute 
or prop for faith, but as elucidating a conception of God. And if Nozick is 
right, and arguments shouldn’t  be about making you believe their con­
clusions, even against your will, then maybe precisely the very best onto­
logical argument, the one greater than which none could be conceived, 
wouldn’t  (and this would be to take back a premise of the ontological 
m eta-argum ent) prove the existence of God, actually.
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6Cf. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, ed. Michel Le Guern (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), vol. 2, 
sec. 397.
7 Nozick might have said that even if it would be an irrational thing for you to 
believe, believing it might nonetheless be the rational thing to do. See The Nature of 
Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 70.
8Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
Introduction. Discussing “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice” (also in 
Socratic Puzzles), Nozick remarks that the two common views on the issue both seem 
to come with compelling arguments: “Given two such compelling opposing arguments, 
it will not do to rest content with one’s belief that one knows what to do. Nor will it do 
to just repeat one of the arguments, loudly and slowly.” (48)
